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ThITELLECTUALPROPERTY 
NEWCOMBE v. ADOLF COORS CO. 
157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Newcombe v. Adolf Coors CO., l the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a Major League base-
ball pitcher, retired for over thirty years, had valid publicity 
infringement claims against defendants who created an adver-
tisement using a drawing of his stance.2 According to the court, 
a material factual issue existed as to whether the drawing of 
the stance in the advertisement conjured up images of the 
pitcher, even though the pitcher's face could not be identified 
from the drawing, and his name did not appear anywhere in 
the advertisement.3 Thus, the court found a subtle image such 
as a stance may constitute like~ess for claims under section 
3344(a) ofthe California Civil Code4 and common law.5 
1. 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998). The appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California was argued and submitted on June 3, 1997 
before Chief Judge Hug, Circuit Judge Fernandez and Circuit Judge Rymer. The 
opinion was filed on September 22,1998. Chief Judge Hug authored the opinion. 
2. See id. at 689, 694. 
3. See id. at 689, 692. 
4. See CAL. CIY. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997), which states, in relevant part: 
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, 
or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise or goods, or for 
purposes of advertising or selling, or for soliciting purchases of, products, 
merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent ... shall be 
liable for any damages sustained by the person injured as a result thereof. 
[d. This section complements, rather than replaces or codifies, the common law cause of 
action for commercial misappropriation of the right of publicity. See id. at 3344(g). 
Section 3344(g) specifically provides that the statutory remedies of the section are 
cumulative and in addition to any others provided by law. See id. 
5. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at '392-93. Judge Jerome Frank created both the 
concept and the label "right of publicity" when he wrote the opinion in the seminal 
131 
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Donald Newcombe was a Major League Baseball all-star 
player.s He pitched for the Brooklyn Dodgers and other teams 
from 1949 to 1960.7 
The defendants, Killian's Irish Beer, owned by Coors Brew-
ing Co., published an advertisement in the February 1994 
Sports Illustrated "Swimsuit Edition," featuring a drawing of 
an old-time baseball game.8 The drawing focused on a pitcher 
in the windup position, with two other players in the back-
ground. 9 Newcombe's face was not identifiable in the drawing, 
his name did not appear anywhere in the advertisement, the 
players' uniforms did not depict an actual team, and the back-
ground did not depict an actual stadium.1o Nevertheless, New-
combe and his friends, family, and former teammates immedi-
ately recognized the pitcher featured in the advertisement as 
Newcombe. 11 
On March 10, 1994, Newcombe filed suit in California state 
court, alleging that his identity had been misappropriated in 
violation of his California statutory right of publicity and com-
Haelan baseball trading card case, Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 
Inc., 202 F.2d 866, (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). Haelan held that 
under New York state law there was a "right of publicity," separate and apart from the 
right of privacy. See id. at 868. In Eastwood v. Superior Court, the California Court of 
Appeal fleshed out the elements of the common law right of publicity cause of action 
taken from Prosser's widely cited treatise on torts. See Eastwood v. Superior Court, 
198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)(citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. 
L. REV. 383, 385 (1960». 
6. See Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 1998). 
7. See id. Newcombe was one of the first African·American players to play major 
league baseball following Jackie Robinson. See id. Newcombe is also the only player in 
major league history to have won the Most Valuable Player Award, the Cy Young 
Award, and the Rookie of the Year Award. See id. Newcombe's baseball career ended 
because of his service in the Army and alcohol abuse. See id. He is a recovering 
alcoholic, who has devoted a great deal oftime to speaking about the dangers of alcohol 
abuse, including serving as a spokesperson for the National Institute on Drug and 
Alcohol Abuse. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 689. Currently, Newcombe is the Director 
of Community Relations with the Los Angeles Dodgers, where he continues his active 
role in speaking against alcohol abuse. See id. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. 
10. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 689. 
11. See id. 
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mon law right of privacy. 12 Newcombe sought to enjoin the ad-
vertisement from future publication, and requested 
$100,000,000 in damages. 13 Coors denied that the drawing of 
the pitcher in the advertisement was a likeness of Newcombe, 
but admitted that the drawing was based on a newspaper pho-
tograph of Newcombe pitching in the 1949 World Series. 14 The 
drawing in the advertisement appeared to be nearly an exact 
replica of the newspaper photograph of Newcombe. 15 
On April 8, 1994, the district court granted defendants' mo-
tion for removal to federal court on the basis of diversity juris-
diction. 16 The district court then granted the defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment on all of the claims. 17 Newcombe 
appealed. 18 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's summary 
judgment order after analyzing the requirements of the statu-
tory and common law publicity claims, finding that sufficient 
issues of material fact existed. 19 
12. See id. Newcombe also alleged that the advertisement was defamatory since it 
showed him, a recovering alcoholic, as endorsing beer, and further alleged intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and defamation. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d 
at 689, 694. 
13. See id. at 689. Newcombe named Coors, Foote Cone & Belding Advertising 
(Belding), creator ofthe advertisement, and Time, Inc., publisher of Sports Illustrated, 
as defendants. See id. 
14. See id. at 690. 
15. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 690. 
16. See id. 
17. See id. 
18. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 690. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's 
order denying Newcombe's motion to remand the case to state court. See id. at 69l. 
19. See Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692, 694 (9th Cir. 1998). The 
Ninth Circuit also reversed the order of summary judgment in favor of defendants 
Coors and Belding on the claim for equitable relief and constructive trust, but affirmed 
the judgment of the district court in all other respects. See id. at 696. The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the lower court's summary judgment order in favor of defendant Time, 
Inc. See id. Time, Inc. was not liable under Newcombe's common law publicity claim 
because it did not directly benefit from the use of Newcombe's likeness. See id. Time, 
Inc. received only payment for the advertising space, which was unrelated to the 
contents of the advertisement. See id. at 693. Also, CAL. CIV. CODE Section 3344(0 
(West 1997) expressly exempts from liability "owners of any medium used for 
3
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The first requirement for both the statutory20 and common 
law21 claims is use of the plaintiffs "likeness,"22 According to 
the Ninth Circuit, the pitcher depicted in the advertisement 
had to be readily identifiable as Newcombe to constitute New-
combe's likeness.23 The court found, however, that a pitcher's 
stance could be so distinctive as to make it readily identifiable 
as a likeness of the particular pitcher, regardless of the visibil-
ity of his face or the markings on the uniform.24 Thus, stance 
alone may constitute a person's likeness under both the statute 
and common law. 25 
Based on the record, the Ninth Circuit found that New-
combe was the only pitcher to use the particular stance de-
picted in the advertisement's drawing.26 Also, Newcombe, and 
those who knew him, immediately recognized the pitcher fea-
advertising ... by whom any advertisement or solicitation in violation of this section is 
published or disseminated, unless it is established that such owners or employees had 
knowledge of the unauthorized use of the person's ... likeness as prohibited by this 
section." 1d. The court held Time, Inc. absolved from liability under Newcombe's 
statutory publicity rights infringement claim, as Newcombe "failed to allege that Time, 
Inc. knew that Newcombe had not authorized use of his likeness." Newcombe, 157 F.3d 
at 694. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's summary judgment order as to 
Newcombe's defamation, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims in favor of all defendants. See id. at 696. The court held that Newcombe failed 
to establish the defamation claim, could not pursue claims for negligent creation or 
publication, and failed to establish an emotional distress claim. See id. at 695, 696. 
20. The California statutory right of publicity claim requires that a plaintiff 
establish, "(1) a 'knowing' use; (2) for purposes of advertising, and (3) a direct 
connection between the use and the commercial purpose." CAL. CIY. CODE § 3344 
(West 1997). 
21. The common law cause of action for commercial misappropriation in California 
requires that a plaintiff prove: "(I) the defendant's use of the plaintiffs identity; (2) the 
appropriation of plaintiffs name or likeness to defendant's advantage, commercially or 
otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury." Eastwood v. Superior Court of 
Los Angeles County, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), quoted in Newcombe 
v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692 (9th Cir. 1998). The common law right of 
publicity test, also known as the "Eastwood Test," is based on Dean Prosser's fourth 
category of invasion of privacy. See Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 346. 
22. "Likeness" is a visual image of a person other than a photograph. Newcombe, 
157 F.3d at 692. 
23. See id. The Ninth Circuit applied the test of CAL. CIY. CODE section 3344 (b) 
(West 1997) for photographs to likenesses, holding that a photograph and a visual 
image are sufficiently similar that the statutory test should apply to determining 
whether likeness exists, as well. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 692. 
24. See id. at 693. 
25. See id. at 692. 
26. See id. 
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tured in the advertisement as Newcombe.27 Accordingly, the 
court found that whether the stance in the advertisement's 
drawing was Newcombe's likeness presented a genuine issue of 
material fact.28 
Second, both the statutory and common law claims required 
Newcombe to prove that a triable issue of fact existed as to 
whether the defendants used his likeness for their commercial 
advantage.29 According to the court, "Newcombe's likeness was 
certainly used to Coors' and Belding's commercial advantage as 
the drawing which resembled Newcombe was a central figure 
in the advertisement and the purpose of the advertisement was 
to attract attention.'>30 
Finally, Newcombe had to show that he did not consent to 
the use of his likeness and that injury resulted because he re-
ceived no compensation for the use.31 The court found that here 
too, issues of material fact existed.32 Thus, Newcombe met the 
requirements for sustaining both the statutory and common 
law misappropriation claims against the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment.33 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the district court's summary judgment order. 34 
27. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 689. 
28. See id. at 693. In addition, the court examined other factors helping create a 
genuine material issue of fact as to whether the defendants used Newcombe's likeness. 
See id. The court discussed the similarities between the person depicted in the 
advertisement and Newcombe. See id. For example, both Newcombe and the pitcher 
in the drawing have moderately dark skin, and the uniform number in the 
advertisement ("39") is only slightly different than Newcombe's number ("36"). See id. 
According to the Court, these similarities, viewed together, could arguably conjure up 
images of Newcombe. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 693. 
29. See id. This part of the common law test for the misappropriation claim was 
not met as against Time, Inc. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
30. Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 693 (citing Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 349 ("one of the 
primary purposes of advertising is to motivate a decision to purchase a particular 
product or service. The first step toward selling a product or service is to attract the 
consumers' attention")). 
31. See id. 
32. See id. 
33. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 693. The statutory right of publicity claim 
required Newcombe to show that the use of his "likeness was ... directly connected with 
the commercial sponsorship" of the defendants. Id. This was a question of fact. See id. 
at 694. The Ninth Circuit, expressly disagreeing with the district court, stated that it 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION 
In Newcombe, the Ninth Circuit broadened the defmition of 
"likeness" in right of publicity cases to include a drawing of 
stance in an advertisement.35 By so doing, the court increased 
the protection afforded to celebrities and creators through the 
"right of publicity."36 Newcombe is one of a series of Ninth Cir-
cuit decisions expanding the rights of celebrities to control their 
images. 
In Motschenbacker u. R J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. ,37 the plain-
tiff, a famous race car driver, claimed that a cigarette adver-
tisement using a car identifiable as one usually driven by him, 
infringed his publicity rights.38 There, the defendants televised 
a commercial utilizing "a 'stock' color photograph" depicting 
plaintiff, whose "facial features [we]re not visible" in the car.39 
The car in the photograph displayed a distinctive narrow white 
pinstripe and an oval white background for the racing number, 
which, had exclusively appeared on plaintiffs cars for about four 
would not be unreasonable for a jury to find that there was a direct connection between 
Newcombe, as the central feature of the advertisement, and the commercial 
sponsorship of the beer. See id. 
34. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 696. Also, the court held that Newcombe was 
entitled to proceed on his claim for equitable relief and constructive trust against Coors 
and Belding because he now had two valid claims against the defendants Coors and 
Belding. See id. at 694. 
35. See Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692 (9th Cir. 1998). 
36. The right of publicity serves to prevent the unjust enrichment of commercial 
appropriators, to provide an incentive to creators, and to protect the public from 
deception. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573-76 
(1977); accord Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 838 (6th Cir. 
1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Essentially, "it makes advertisers pay for the 
attention-getting value of human identity." J. Thomas McCarthy, The Spring 1995 
Horace S. Manges Lecture - The Human Persona As Commercial Property: The Right 
Of Publicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 148 (1995). 
See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and 
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 135, 178-79 (1993). Madow questions whether 
the right of publicity "should exist at all" because "publicity rights exact a higher cost 
in important competing values (notably, free expression and cultural pluralism) than 
has generally been appreciated." Id. at 134. 
37. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). 
38. See id. at 822. 
39. Id. 
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years when the commercial aired. 40 In Motschenbacker, the 
court held that although the "'likeness' of plaintiff is itself unrec-
ognizable," the distinctive decorations appearing on the car cre-
ate a material issue as to whether the driver is "identifiable as 
plaintiff."41 Then, with little discussion, the Ninth Circuit 
agreed that California law "afford led] legal protection to an indi-
vidual's proprietary interest in his own identity," and reversed 
the lower court's summary judgment order in favor of the defen-
dants.42 
The 1997 case of Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc. 43 also validated 
publicity infringement claimS.44 In Wendt, actors from the tele-
vision show "Cheers" sued the creator of three dimensional ani-
matronic fIgures (robots), which were placed in airport bars, 
modeled upon the Cheers set.45 The plaintiffs alleged that the 
robots were based on the actors' "likenesses."46 Interestingly, the 
court stated that ''It]he degree to which these robots resemble, 
caricature, or bear an impressionistic resemblance 00" the plain-
tiffs was material to determining whether their "likeness" was 
appropriated. 47 The Ninth Circuit held that, whether the robots' 
"physical characteristics" looked sufficiently like the actors was 
a genuine issue of material fact, and reversed the lower court's 
summary judgment order in favor of the defendants. 48 
Newcombe aflirms the Ninth Circuit's steady course toward 
increasing protection of publicity rights. In Newcombe, the 
Ninth Circuit extended the term "likeness" to include a depiction 
of a pitcher's stance, thereby affording it protection under both 
40. See id. Defendants changed plaintiffs number "11" into "71," attached a wing· 
like device known as a "spoiler" to plaintiffs car, added the word "Winston," the name of 
their product, to that spoiler, and removed other advertisements for other products from 
the spoilers of other cars in the televised commercial. See id. 
41. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 827. 
42. Id. at 825,827. 
43. 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997). 
44. See id. 
45. See id. at 809. 
46. See id. 
47. Id. at 810. 
48. Wendt, 125 F.3d at 809·10. 
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California statutory and common laW.49 As the meaning of 
"likeness" expands to resemble that of "identity," section 3344 
will, in effect, protect identity. 50 As Professor Welkowitz states, 
understanding the current state of the law is like trying to 
"catch smoke or nail JELL-O to a wall. "51 Instead of giving law-
yers and their clients guidance, the court has added confusion by 
blurring the lines between "identity" and "likeness." As a result 
of cases such as Newcombe, understanding the difference be-
tween a person's "identity" and "likeness" has become a confus-
ingpuzzle. 
Nairi Chakalian * 
49. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 692. Arguably, however, a person's stance could not 
constitute his "likeness" because it could never actually look like him. However, it may 
constitute his "identity," under the law, if it triggers thoughts of the celebrity in the 
public's mind. See infra note 51. 
50. The depicted stance, arguably, may not constitute Newcombe's likeness 
because it does not "resemble, caricature, or bear an impressionistic resemblance" to 
Newcombe. See Wendt, 125 F.3d at 81.0. Newcombe's facial features were not 
identifiable in the advertisement's drawing and his name did not appear anywhere in 
the advertisement. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 689, 692. Instead, the depicted stance 
was, arguably, part of Newcombe's "identity," because it "evoke[dl the celebrity's image 
in the public's mind." White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 
1992) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from order denying rehearing en banc) (citing White v. 
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398·99 (9th Cir. 1992) (extending California's 
common law right of publicity to protect a celebrity's right to exploit the value of her 
identity». 
Section 3344 protects "name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness" from 
unauthorized commercial appropriation, but not a person's "identity." See CAL. CIY. 
CODE § 3344 (West 1997), supra note 4. If the court had held the depicted stance an 
aspect of Newcombe's "identity," rather than his "likeness," Newcombe would have lost 
his statutory claim. See id. 
51. See David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell·O To A Wall: The 
Vanna White Case And The Limits Of Celebrity Rights. 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67, 101 
(1995). 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 2000. 
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